

Parameters and prospects for the involvement of the European Union in resolving the Myanmar crisis

Abstract. The Rohingya people's issue in Myanmar is one of the most pressing topics in the world today. Myanmar has historically had a problem with religion and interethnic strife. The Rohingya dispute, a Muslim ethnic minority living in Rakhine State's north, is the country's largest and longest-running conflict. The violence erupted primarily because of religious and socioeconomic divisions between Arakanese Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims, who make up most of the Rakhine State's population. This conflict goes back to World War II, and violent battles have occurred in Rakhine State on a regular basis since then, with the goal of driving the Rohingya out of Myanmar. At the end of August 2017, when the conflict reached a new level of escalation, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya were forced to flee neighboring states, fleeing violence directed against them.

The international community, in particular the EU, criticized the Government of Myanmar for failing to take adequate actions and effective measures to resolve the conflict. However, the EU's actions in relation to the genocide in Myanmar have also come under criticism.

In this regard, the author of this article will seek to uncover the involvement of the EU in the Rohingya people's situation in Myanmar, as well as the effectiveness of the EU's measures.

Keywords: EU, genocide, Rohingya, Myanmar, sanctions, democracy.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.32523/2616-6887/2022-139-2-65-76>

Received: 02.12.2021 / Accepted: 26.01.2022

Introduction

As the migration crisis in Europe fades from view, the world is confronted with another challenging situation: the plight of Myanmar's Rohingya people. More than 600,000 Rohingya refugees have fled to Bangladesh to escape persecution since August 25, 2017, while many more remain in Myanmar's Rakhine State. Those who reach refugee camps are frequently injured, with only the clothing on their backs, and are subjected to unimaginable tragedies such as home fires, mass murder, and rape.

For years, this problem has been simmering. Since the 1970s, the Rohingya people, a Muslim minority in Myanmar with a Buddhist majority, have been oppressed by the Myanmar government, which has denied them citizenship, denied them access to social services, and forced them to work. Former Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi and former President U Htin Kyaw have not denounced nor acknowledged the Myanmar government's atrocities against the Rohingya people. The most recent admission of the government's responsibility in the killings of 10 "Bengali terrorists" came the closest. Persecutory acts have increased in frequency and severity in recent years. Researchers from the Queen Mary University of London produced a paper in 2015 that discussed the Rohingya people's escalating "ghettoization, periodic mass executions, and limitations on movement". Attacks against the Rohingya people, according to the study, are the first stages of genocide. This prediction, however, went unheeded [1].

Nonetheless, many countries and organizations were concerned about the fate of the Rohingyas. The EU is one such institution. The EU is a global player with a history of assisting

refugees in need through a variety of specific mechanisms, including the EU Refugee Fund in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, as well as other initiatives such as the Global Refugee Forum. However, the EU's response to the crisis should be classified as either effective or ineffectual, i.e. failures.

The purpose of this research paper is to show the role of the EU in the crisis of the Rohingya people in Myanmar, as well as to reveal how effective the actions applied by the EU were.

Materials and methodology of research

Scientific journals, abstracts, regulatory documents, and official EU websites were used as materials.

General scientific approaches such as observation, historical methods, and analytical approaches were used in this research work. In addition, the fundamentals of a systematic approach - analysis and synthesis - were applied while analyzing the actions of the EU organization in general. A case study analysis and a comparative analysis were used to assess the EU's actions in relation to previous crises, as well as to discover the similarities and differences between them.

Discussion

This problematic issue has been discussed and condemned in many scientific works by authors from different countries. The involvement of the EU in the crisis was divided into two phalanxes, those who criticized the lack of action on the part of the EU and ineffective sanctions, and the small percentage of those who believed the opposite.

According to Sophie Boisseau du Rocher, a senior researcher at the French Institute of International Relations' Center for Asian Studies in Paris, and Felix Hajduk, a senior associate at SWP, the German Institute of International and Strategic Relations in Berlin, Europe has invested heavily in Myanmar's transition to democracy over the last decade, and it can be argued that it has made a significant contribution to the formation of political parties [2]. Furthermore, these experts say that, in attempting to democratize the country, the EU squandered all opportunities to avert genocide by ignoring the indications of genocide's prerequisites. It is also claimed that it has been widely demonstrated that sanctions punish the local population more than the leadership [3].

Many experts also argue that the EU's response has been restricted to financial support, which is not a viable solution to the problem. Scientists compared this phenomenon with a leaky bucket that is constantly filled with water [4].

On the other hand, the EU has the opposite viewpoint. The EU claims to engage in massive propaganda efforts and to be working with the international community to find a method to bring those responsible for grave human rights breaches and abuses in Myanmar to account.

Unfortunately, this crisis has not been resolved and continues, and is being discussed and predicted to this day.

However, for a complete analysis, it is also very important to make a comparison of the EU's actions in relation to other genocides.

EU actions in the genocide in Rwanda

A protracted period of battle inside the EU preceded the genocide in Rwanda. While individual EU member states may be held accountable for Rwanda's devastation (Germany and Belgium before the genocide, and France during the genocide), the EU as a whole deserves to be criticized. Indeed, "Rwanda provided a very simple case for intervention," and "genocide warning indicators were probably as timely and plain as we are expected to see anywhere in the future" [5].

However, Europe had no intention to act militarily or to carry out the humanitarian/peacekeeping missions outlined in the WEU's Petersberg Declaration. In this respect, France's attitude and backing for the interim government did not help. In contrast to their handling of Yugoslavia a few months later, European nations did not hesitate to use the term "g" in this situation. No European government, however, was willing to contribute troops to the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). As a result, Europe failed to have a beneficial impact on "the clearest incidence of genocide in the post-Cold War era".

EU actions in the genocide in Yugoslavia.

The situation in Yugoslavia has given the EU the chance to take the lead in resolving European problems. However, the confrontation merely served to emphasize the EU's inadequacy in this area, enhancing the EU's unfavorable image as an organization "lacking the requisite instruments and expertise" in such situations [6].

In June 1991, the Yugoslav conflicts officially began. Initially, the US urged that Europe bear the brunt of the responsibility for taking the initiative and settling the war that had erupted on their doorstep. The EU has made a commitment. First and foremost, it refused to provide any financial support to Yugoslavia. The weapons embargo and an observation mission were also approved by the EU. By July, a ceasefire had been announced, and the warring parties had assembled on the Brioni Islands under the auspices of the EU for talks. The Brioni Agreement was signed there, which specified that Croatia's and Slovenia's declarations of independence should be deferred for three months. The Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA) had to evacuate from Slovenia during this time. Europe sought to capitalize on this uptick in enthusiasm by convening a peace summit in London in September. It was evident from once that there would be a long and tough road ahead before any reconciliation could take place. According to reports, the Serbian and Croatian leaders exchanged "many belligerent remarks" [7].

The recognition of the new republics was one of the primary topics debated during the Conference. While most EU members had a "wait-and-see" attitude toward separatist nations during this time, Germany made it plain that it rejects the Yugoslav federal army's conduct and will support the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. It also vowed to take the issue to court on its own if the EC failed to reach an agreement soon. A single European viewpoint, according to the German government, would be ideal since it would give the dispute an international dimension and allow for further foreign participation. On the other hand, several of the Twelve (particularly France) were vehement in their opposition to the new republics' recognition. The EU finally agreed to allow the delay in recognition, stating that it "should take place within the framework of a wider peace accord".

The prospect of military involvement was also raised at the September peace conference. Prior to the Conference, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas urged that the WEU create an intervention force. Despite France's backing, Great Britain, which was hostile to the concept of increasing European cooperation in the field of peacekeeping, and Germany, which was loath to send its own forces on foreign intervention missions, as well as Spain and Greece, were all against the plan. As a result, the mission was never completed. France next shifted its focus to the United Nations, attempting to utilize its clout as a Security Council member to establish an emergency UN force for Yugoslavia. This idea was blocked by the United Kingdom, which was on the verge of a general election and did not want to deploy soldiers to the battle.

The Brioni Accord was rendered useless by the JNA's continuous attacks on Dubrovnik. The European Commission retaliated by threatening economic measures if the hostile acts did not cease by October 7. Despite this, the Community remained optimistic about the outcome of the peace talks. Despite this, the JNA continued its assaults, this time focusing on the Croatian city of Vukovar. As a result, the EU was compelled to impose economic penalties and to request that the UN impose an

oil embargo and participate in a peacekeeping operation. These demands exposed the EU's frailty. "Additionally, the belligerents wanted the UN's participation after being dissatisfied by Europe's activities".

The initial purpose of Europe, to maintain a unified Yugoslav state, was nearly forgotten. There were still differences about whether Croatia and Slovenia should be recognized as autonomous states.

By mid-1994, the US had agreed to form a special group of diplomats to resolve the crisis (with the cooperation of some, but not all, European governments). As a result, European genocide governance virtually came to an end. Since then, the United States has maintained its dominant position.

Finally, Yugoslavia has exposed several flaws in the EU's approach to conflict prevention and genocide prevention. First, the "hour of Europe," or the opportunity for Europe to correct its secondary role in international conflict resolution, was short-lived, as it became evident that the Community was incapable of dealing with such a crisis. One of the most significant roadblocks to advancement was Europe's inability to speak with a single voice. Internal strife has been a stumbling block in Europe, NATO, and the United Nations. From Germany's *Alleingang* farce to Britain's initial hesitation to send soldiers, France's obstruction of NATO airstrikes to support its ground forces, and so on. The Maastricht Treaty and the newly developed peacekeeping capability of the Petersberg tasks had restored the WEU's importance by 1992. The WEU missions' optional status, on the other hand, has proven unhelpful in settling large-scale conflicts, such as the Balkans issue.

When all of the above-mentioned genocides are examined together, a clear pattern emerges in numerous EU reactions to genocide. Mass crimes were recognized long before multiple warning signs were obvious. Soft language is employed to defuse the sense of urgency. Humanitarian and development aid, as well as cash for any "invasive operations," such as UN peacekeeping and monitoring missions, are supplied (which may be diverted for other reasons). In addition to money, the EU generally refrains from taking part in such initiatives. The Union only uses military force on rare occasions, preferring instead to enforce a weapons embargo. In truth, while military action is not a replacement for prevention, it is frequently more effective than humanitarian intervention in saving lives when carried out properly and at the correct moment [8]. However, the EU still has much room for development, even if it lacks the capability or motivation to engage in military action. In the near term (by decreasing political/diplomatic links), a speedier response to warning indications and tougher phrasing in the identification of crimes would be inconvenient for the EU, but it would give legitimacy to the image of Europe as an "ethical force". "In areas like Myanmar, the EU might be a greater champion for ICC involvement, as impunity for past crimes is a risk factor for future atrocities".

In all these conflicts, the European unwillingness to support military intervention is evident.

The European Union could participate in military and civilian operations under the Common Security and Defense Policy (established in 1999). Since the Maastricht Treaty, which established a more visible WEU in 1992, the EU has been empowered to use military force on paper. The WEU was given the power to "create and execute Union decisions and actions that have defense repercussions" under Article J.4 (2) of the Treaty. The Council should take the required practical actions in collaboration with the WEU institutions". Indeed, the purpose of this development "was for the European Union to have defensive weapons at its disposal, through the WEU, that would allow it to intervene and impose military force" [9]. In general, the WEU, and then the EU itself, were unwilling to commit to such measures.

In the crises, this lack of motivation was instantly apparent. Throughout the crisis, the European Community has maintained that dialogue with and among the belligerents is the most

effective way to resolve the situation. Instead, "Europeans' refusal to accept military involvement with defined political aims proved to be the principal impediment to reaching a solution" [10].

Another significant issue is also being discussed. There is a reluctance to use the term "genocide" to describe the war.

Despite overwhelming proof, genocides are sometimes not accorded their proper designation until the very end of a fight.

According to UN General Assembly Resolution 47/121, Europe had the potential in December 1992 to take a position and proclaim ethnic cleansing, and then the events in Bosnia, a type of genocide. However, Austria was the only Western European country to vote in support of the idea, with the 11 others opting to abstain.

In Rwanda, there was a comparable in capacity to identify and humiliate. "Based on the information that has surfaced, there can be no question that this constituted genocide since mass executions of communities and families belonging to a single ethnic group took happened," remarked then-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in May 1994 [11].

The Union's reluctance to employ strong, precise language, as mentioned during the Myanmar discussion, has not faded over time, and the problem endures. Furthermore, Rwanda and Myanmar have shown that successful activities are not automatically triggered even after the "g-word" impediment is overcome.

Results

Considering all the above, it is worth making a real analysis of the effectiveness and inefficiency of EU actions towards the Myanmar crisis.

It is necessary to first evaluate the EU's activities that resulted in failure. In 2011, the EU began supporting democracy promotion, and in 2015, the STEP Democracy initiative was created to aid Myanmar's democratic transition [12]. Despite the worsening of Myanmar's human rights situation over the last decade, the Western world has increased its support for the government's mission to promote democracy, with the European Union even declaring that it is proud to be "at the forefront of the international community's resumption of cooperation with Myanmar". The EU also expressed its gratitude to Myanmar for taking "good steps" to improve the country's human rights situation. At the same time, the EU acknowledges that Myanmar has major human rights issues. In 2016, the EU presented a human rights resolution to the UN Human Rights Council and created a fact-finding mission in response to the Rohingya crisis [13]. As a result, the EU's ties with Myanmar were defined by mixed signals: optimism for development and acceptance of reality.

However, their friendship has deteriorated because of Myanmar's recent military upheaval. After all, when the country was undergoing transformation, the military held the highest decision-making power. Burmese intolerance of non-Burmese, fear of terrorism penetration, inability to redefine the concept of sovereignty, and, despite this, a Westphalian understanding of the international order. As a result, the EU's efforts to persuade Myanmar that international law and good governance must be followed in resolving the conflict have failed. In addition, the EU neglected the precondition of genocide in its attempt to democratize Myanmar.

However, it is crucial to emphasize that the EU was not altogether incorrect about Myanmar's prospects for improvement, as the nation took significant strides toward democracy in November 2015, with genuine elections and Aung San Suu Kyi's de facto rule. Furthermore, the military, which is an autonomous political power, was mostly responsible for genocide against the Rohingya people. Regardless of whether these measures are performed by the government or not, the EU cannot truly advance democracy by backing a state that forces hundreds of thousands of ethnic minorities to emigrate.

Despite the EU's failure, we must not overlook the support offered. Since 1994, the European Commission's Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid activities have sponsored emergency assistance initiatives in Myanmar's Rakhine State and Bangladesh's Cox's Bazar region. To assist the delivery of EU humanitarian help, the EU opened offices in Dhaka (Bangladesh) in 2002 and Yangon (Myanmar) in 2005 [14].

The EU supported initiatives in Myanmar's Rakhine State in 2018 to address some of the most pressing needs (such as protection, shelter, health, water, sanitation, food, and psychosocial support) for displaced people and host communities affected by violent outbreaks. The EU continues to offer basic services in collaboration with humanitarian partners. It is crucial to safeguard the safety of humanitarian workers as well as unrestricted access to impacted areas to provide this critical aid [15].

Through international NGOs and the UN, the EU has also supplied financing to offer crucial support to unregistered Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh.

During the monsoon season, the EU has contributed 36 million euros in basic medical care, water supply, sanitation, housing, nourishment, protection, psychological support, and disaster risk reduction aid. Since 2007, the overall amount of financing for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh has surpassed 86 million euros, according to the newest grants.

Aside from this critical assistance, EU humanitarian aid advocates for improved communication with displaced people and a more protection-oriented support structure. In October 2017, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism was activated in response to the large influx of Rohingya refugees following the recent outbreaks of violence, to contribute to the coordination center established to ensure a greater humanitarian presence and support for humanitarian activities provided to Rohingya refugees.

In addition, the EU has devised a project with the Intersectoral Coordination Group "ISCG" that will run from September 2, 2020, to September 2, 2023 (36 months). The initiative intends to continue work in the Cox's Bazar area to strengthen the resilience of Rohingya refugees and their host communities. The initiative also includes actions targeted at resolving the health and economic issues that COVID-19 has produced. This project has been given a budget of EUR 27,763,389 by the European Union. The following are the project's tasks:

- Strengthen protection and empower refugees and host communities.
- Strengthen assistance in preventing the spread of coronavirus (COVID-19) and responding to the socioeconomic consequences of the crisis.

Expected results from this project:

- Expanding opportunities to involve refugees in camp management and coordination of their activities;
- Expanded access to civil status and status registration documents;
- Strengthening assistance in preventing the spread of coronavirus (COVID-19) and responding to the socioeconomic consequences of the crisis through livelihood support [16].

It is also necessary to consider the potential impact of the EU Pact on the situation with Rohingya refugees.

According to a press release issued by the EU Mission to ASEAN on October 15, 2020, there is a "significant funding gap" in the international response to the Rohingya refugee crisis this year, and the US, UK, EU, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) planned to hold a joint online donor conference to close the gap. A week later, on October 22, a summit highlighted by Myanmar's absence took hold, at which donors offered US\$ 600 million to support the Rohingya. M.D. Shahriar Alam, Bangladesh's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, warned at the conference that Bangladesh could no longer carry the weight of the refugee crisis and that the Rohingya would have to return to Myanmar as soon as possible. During a phone conversation with his Bangladeshi

counterpart on the evening of the donor conference, the Chinese Foreign Minister stated that a trilateral meeting of foreign ministers between Bangladesh, China, and Myanmar would be held soon, and that Myanmar had assured China that the Rohingya would be returned.

According to the European Commission, the new EU Migration and Asylum Pact (EU Pact) was proposed to create "a system that manages and normalizes migration in the long term" and is "fully based on European values and international law" and is "conditioned by the United Nations Global Refugee Compact (UN GCR) and EU Treaties". This presentation to the ASILE Forum intends to offer some light on the EU's potential role in relieving the Rohingya's misery in the coming days, with a focus on the EU Pact. It's written from the perspective of two worlds. First and foremost, the European Union (EU) has played a critical role in providing finances to help Rohingya refugees. Second, despite the EU's humanitarian, development, and conflict prevention assistance, the Bangladeshi government aggressively sought China's participation and help in addressing the Rohingya refugee crisis, rather than depending primarily on EU diplomatic assistance or UN-sponsored procedures. It is important to remember that China previously declined to denounce Myanmar for its atrocities against the Rohingya and, although being invited, did not attend the Rohingya Conference with Russia [17].

The EU Pact aims to strengthen collaboration with partners by creating "individual" methods that take into consideration their specific circumstances. These strategies will be focused on a variety of factors, including refugee protection and assistance to refugee-receiving nations, as well as tackling the core causes of illegal migration. To date, the EU's reaction to the Rohingya refugee crisis has consisted of a combination of financial aid and sanctions. As a reaction to the Rohingya's situation, the EU has provided humanitarian and development assistance worth more than 226 million euros in the form of "food aid, housing, medical care, water and sanitation support, nutrition assistance, education, and protection services" since 2017. The European Council renewed Myanmar's existing sanctions regime for another year in April 2020. However, this does not rule out the possibility of the EU maintaining "relationships" with Myanmar. The EU is "Myanmar's third-largest trading partner", behind China and Thailand.

However, in light of the foregoing, the issue of how well the EU meets its commitments to assist the EU arises "Return of the Rohingya people to their homes in a secure, sustainable, and dignified manner, with UNHCR's full involvement and in line with international law". To guarantee that the EU's individual approach based on the EU Pact remains effective in the future, it must ensure that the initiatives it funds do not wind up "confirming Myanmar's structural prejudice and isolation". " It will be difficult for the EU to do this while continuing to give crucial support to Myanmar in its democratic transition. However, this should not be used as an excuse for the EU to avoid revising its approach to addressing a complicated issue such as the Rohingya refugee crisis, which has impacted millions of people for decades.

Taking these realities into consideration, this article recounts the historical growth of the Rohingya refugee crisis and Bangladesh's role in it. It then goes on to explain how the EU may use its new Pact to inspire a worldwide effort to address the Rohingya refugee crisis. In many respects, this contribution purposefully raises more issues than it answers to provide a new starting point for future debates on the EU's role in the Rohingya refugee crisis.

Conclusion

Finally, it should be emphasized that the EU's efforts to interfere at various phases of its foreign policy and crisis management have been hampered by several recurrent issues. Despite apparent warning signs, the Union/member states' governments frequently adopt "soft language" and refuse to use the term "genocide". For example, the horrors in Myanmar (2016/17) were preceded

by several warning indicators that were disregarded in the previous decade. In the instance of Myanmar, the EU voiced concern over human rights breaches in its 2016 EU Strategy, however, it was later discovered that the EU misjudged "the government's refusal to respect the Rohingya's human rights," rather than "genocide". Cambodia, Rwanda, and South Ossetia were all affected in the same way.

Another issue that plagues all genocides is the general hesitation about using military troops. In fact, the EU prefers to use diplomacy to encourage democratic changes rather than sending in its own soldiers.

In general, it became obvious during the resolution of these disagreements that each EU nation has its own unique approach, which prohibits the operator from acting with a single voice.

Regarding the actual genocide in Myanmar, the current EU policy on the Rohingya crisis is largely focused on humanitarian aid and sanctions. However, this is not enough.

While the EU continues to provide exclusively financial assistance to refugees fleeing persecution and violence, and while it may have long-term goals to alleviate the situation, it has not done enough to prevent the ongoing persecution of the Rohingya by the military, as well as their repatriation. The EU has a responsibility to do more now, given its huge monetary resources and global political and economic influence. Unfortunately, none of the EU's measures to improve the lives of the Rohingya can give them an instant respite.

The fact that the EU only provides financial assistance is commendable, but it would be even better if the EU first worked with Bangladesh to strengthen the rights of the Rohingya in Bangladesh, adhering to the principle of nonrefoulement, and then facilitated the resettlement of refugees until the Rohingya can safely return to Myanmar. In this regard, the opinions and suggestions of experts Claire Cappaert and Lisa Qu deserve full approval. In their opinion, although Bangladesh and Myanmar have agreed to repatriate some refugees to Myanmar, there is no reason to believe that the place where they will be accepted is safe or devoid of violence or persecution. Bangladesh, on the other hand, will not be able to accept migrants in the long term, as it is still a poor country unable to cope with this problem, and intends to accommodate refugees on Bhashan Char, an island prone to flooding. As a result, a strategy is required to resettle refugees in other places, such as the European Union or neighboring countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Bangladesh can benefit from the EU's assistance, experience, and understanding in dealing with its own refugee situation by providing logistical, supply, documentation, and security assistance. This will serve as an impetus for them to restore their trust in the international community, which has waned over time.

Nevertheless, the EU must consider all these factors and act faster, because the Rohingya, faced with rape, violence, and severe suffering, do not have time to wait.

References

1. Claire Cappaert, Lisa Qu From One Refugee Crisis to the Next: The Role of the EU in the Rohingya Crisis. [Web resource]. – 2022. – URL: <https://voices.uchicago.edu/euchicago/from-one-refugee-crisis-to-the-next-the-role-of-the-eu-in-the-rohingya-crisis/> (accessed 28.10.2021).
2. Sophie Boisseau du Rocher, Felix Heiduk Can Europe Make a Difference in Myanmar? [Web resource]. – 2022. – URL: <https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/can-europe-make-a-difference-in-myanmar/> (accessed 28.10.2021).
3. Ajmani, M., Joshi, P. K., Kishore, A. and Roy, D. How Did Sanctions Impact Myanmar? The Diplomat. [Web resource]. – 2022. – URL:

- <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/how-didsanctions-impact-myanmar/> (accessed 15.10.2021).
4. IPAC Report on Indonesia and the Rohingya Crisis // Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Report – 2018 - No. 46. [Web resource]. – 2022. – URL:<http://www.understandingconflict.org/en/conflict/read/71/Indonesia-and-theRohingya-Crisis> (accessed 01.11.2021).
 5. Valentino B.A. Still standing by: why America and the international community fail to prevent genocide and mass killing. Perspectives on politics. – 2003. – № 1(3). – P. 565-578.
 6. Lucarelli S. Europe's Response to the Yugoslav Imbroglio. European approaches to crisis management / S. Lucarelli. – The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997. – 100 p.
 7. Yugoslavs joust at peace meeting, 1991. [Web resource]. – 2022. – URL: [Nytimes.com](https://www.nytimes.com) (accessed 01.11.2021).
 8. Kuperman, A.J. The limits of humanitarian intervention: Genocide in Rwanda. – Brookings Institution Press. – 2004. – 100 p.
 9. Operational Forces Of WEU - Western European Union, 2015. [Web resource]. – 2022. – URL: [Cvce.eu](https://www.cvce.eu) (accessed 01.11.2021).
 10. Cohen B. Why Europe Failed to Halt the Genocide in Bosnia. Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 1993. – P. 39.
 11. Reports of the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council S/1994/640. 1994. [Web resource]. – 2022. – URL: [Undocs.org](https://www.undocs.org). (accessed 01.11.2021).
 12. Support to electoral processes and democracy – step democracy. [Web resource]. – 2022. – URL: <https://www.idea.int/news-media/multimedia-reports/step-democracy> (accessed 10.11.2021).
 13. Marchi Ludovica The EU in the non-European world: the case of ASEAN and Myanmar. In: Marchi, Ludovica, (ed.) The European Union and Myanmar: Interactions via ASEAN. Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series. Routledge, London, UK, 2020. – P.10.
 14. European civil protection and humanitarian aid operations. [Web resource]. – 2022. – URL: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/asia-and-pacific/myanmar_en (accessed 01.11.2021).
 15. Evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian response to the Rohingya refugee crisis in Myanmar and Bangladesh, 2017-2019. – Final Report June, 2021. – P.10.
 16. EU and Myanmar International Partnerships, 2020. [Web resource]. – 2022. – URL: https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/where-we-work/myanmar_en (accessed 14.11.2021).
 17. New Pact on Migration and Asylum. A fresh start on migration in Europe. [Web resource]. – 2022. – URL: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/new-pact-migration-and-asylum_en (accessed 2.11.2021).

М.М. Малгаждарова, Л.К. Ахметжанова

Л.Н.Гумилев атындағы Еуразия ұлттық университеті, Нұр-Сұлтан, Қазақстан

**Еуропалық Одақтың Мьянмадағы дағдарысты реттеуге қатысуының
өлшемдері мен мүмкіндіктері**

Аңдатпа. Мьянмадағы рохинджа халқының мәселесі қазіргі әлемдегі ең өзекті тақырыптардың бірі болып табылады. Мьянмада дін мен ұлтаралық араздыққа қатысты тарихи проблемалар болды. Рохинждің дау-дамайы, Ракхайнның солтүстігінде тұратын мұсылман этникалық азшылық-бұл елдегі ең үлкен және ұзаққа созылған қақтығыс. Зорлық-зомбылық негізінен Ракхайн штатының көп бөлігін құрайтын Аракан буддистері мен рохинджа мұсылмандары арасындағы діни және әлеуметтік-экономикалық келіспеушіліктердің нәтижесінде пайда болды. Бұл қақтығыс Екінші дүниежүзілік соғыстан басталады, содан бері Рохинжді Мьянмадан қуып шығару үшін Ракхайн штатында үнемі қызу шайқастар болды. 2017 жылдың тамыз айының соңында, қақтығыс ушығудың жаңа деңгейіне жеткен кезде, жүздеген мың рохинджа оларға қарсы бағытталған зорлық-зомбылықтан қашып, көрші мемлекеттерге қашуға мәжбүр болды.

Халықаралық қауымдастық, атап айтқанда ЕО, Мьянма үкіметі жанжалды шешу үшін тиісті шаралар мен тиімді шаралар қолдана алмағаны үшін айыптады. Алайда, Мьянмадағы геноцидке байланысты ЕО әрекеттері де қатар сынға ұшырады.

Осыған байланысты, автор Мьянма мәселесінде ЕО-ның рөлі, сондай-ақ ЕО шараларының тиімділігі сияқты ең өзекті сұрақтарға жауап беруге тырысады.

Түйін сөздер: ЕО, геноцид, рохинджа, Мьянма, Санкция, демократия.

М.М. Малгаждарова, Л.К. Ахметжанова

Евразийский национальный университет им.Л.Н.Гумилева, Нур-Султан, Казахстан

Параметры и перспективы участия Европейского Союза в разрешении кризиса в Мьянме

Аннотация. Проблема народа рохинджа в Мьянме является одной из самых актуальных тем в современном мире. В Мьянме исторически существовали проблемы с религией и межэтнической враждой. Спор рохинджа, мусульманского этнического меньшинства, проживающего на севере штата Ракхайн, является крупнейшим и продолжительным конфликтом в стране. Насилие вспыхнуло главным образом в результате религиозных и социально-экономических разногласий между буддистами Аракане и мусульманами рохинджа, которые составляют большинство населения штата Ракхайн. Этот конфликт восходит ко Второй мировой войне, и с тех пор в штате Ракхайн регулярно происходили ожесточенные сражения с целью изгнать рохинджа из Мьянмы. В конце августа 2017 года, когда конфликт достиг нового уровня эскалации, сотни тысяч рохинджа были вынуждены бежать в соседние государства, спасаясь от насилия, направленного против них.

Международное сообщество, в частности ЕС, раскритиковали правительство Мьянмы за неспособность предпринять адекватные действия и эффективные меры для урегулирования конфликта. Однако действия ЕС в связи с геноцидом в Мьянме также подверглись критике.

В связи с этим, автор данной статьи попытается ответить на наиболее актуальные вопросы, такие как, какую роль играет ЕС в проблеме Мьянмы, а также эффективность мер ЕС.

Ключевые слова: ЕС, геноцид, рохинджа, Мьянма, санкции, демократия.

References

1. Claire Cappaert, Lisa Qu From One Refugee Crisis to the Next: The Role of the EU in the Rohingya Crisis. Available at: <https://voices.uchicago.edu/euchicago/from-one-refugee-crisis-to-the-next-the-role-of-the-eu-in-the-rohingya-crisis/> (accessed 28.10.2021).
2. Sophie Boisseau du Rocher, Felix Heiduk Can Europe Make a Difference in Myanmar? Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/can-europe-make-a-difference-in-myanmar/> (accessed 28.10.2021).
3. Ajmani, M., Joshi, P. K., Kishore, A. and Roy, D. How Did Sanctions Impact Myanmar? The Diplomat. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/how-didsanctions-impact-myanmar/> (accessed 15.10.2021).
4. IPAC Report on Indonesia and the Rohingya Crisis // Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Report – 2018 - No. 46. Available at: <http://www.understandingconflict.org/en/conflict/read/71/Indonesia-and-theRohingya-Crisis> (accessed 01.11.2021).
5. Valentino B.A. Still standing by: why America and the international community fail to prevent genocide and mass killing. Perspectives on politics. 2003. No. 1(3). P. 565-578.
6. Lucarelli S. Europe's Response to the Yugoslav Imbroglio. European approaches to crisis management, (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997, 100 p.).
7. Yugoslavs joust at peace meeting, 1991. Available at: Nytimes.com (accessed 01.11.2021).
8. Kuperman, A.J. The limits of humanitarian intervention: Genocide in Rwanda, (Brookings Institution Press, 2004, 100 p.).
9. Operational Forces Of WEU - Western European Union, 2015. [Web Available at: Cvce.eu (accessed 01.11.2021).
10. Cohen B. Why Europe Failed to Halt the Genocide in Bosnia. Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 1993. P. 39.
11. Reports of the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council S/1994/640. 1994. Available at: Undocs.org. (accessed 01.11.2021).
12. Support to electoral processes and democracy – step democracy. Available at: <https://www.idea.int/news-media/multimedia-reports/step-democracy> (accessed 10.11.2021).
13. Marchi Ludovica The EU in the non-European world: the case of ASEAN and Myanmar. In: Marchi, Ludovica, (ed.) The European Union and Myanmar: Interactions via ASEAN. Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series. Routledge, London, UK, 2020. P.10.
14. European civil protection and humanitarian aid operations. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/asia-and-pacific/myanmar_en (accessed 01.11.2021).
15. Evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian response to the Rohingya refugee crisis in Myanmar and Bangladesh, 2017-2019. Final Report June, 2021. P.10.
16. EU and Myanmar International Partnerships, 2020. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/where-we-work/myanmar_en (accessed 14.11.2021).
17. New Pact on Migration and Asylum. A fresh start on migration in Europe. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/new-pact-migration-and-asylum_en (accessed 2.11.2021).

Information about the authors:

Malgazharova Meruyert Muratzhankyzy – the 1st year Ph.D. student of the Faculty of International Relations, L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan.

Akhmetzhanova Leila Kamidullayevna – Candidate of Historical Sciences, scientific supervisor, Associate Professor of the International Relations Department, L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan.

Малгаждарова Меруерт Мұратжанқызы – халықаралық қатынастар факультетінің 1 курс докторанты, Л.Н.Гумилев атындағы Еуразия ұлттық университеті, Нұр-сұлтан, Қазақстан.

Ахметжанова Лейла Камидуллаевна – тарих ғылымдарының кандидаты, ғылыми жетекші, халықаралық қатынастар кафедрасының доценті, Л.Н.Гумилев атындағы Еуразия ұлттық университеті, Нұр-сұлтан Қ., Қазақстан.